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ABSTRACT
In this report, we have reviewed the basic features of the accident processes and radioactivity releases that occurred in
the Chernobyl accident (1986) and in the Fukushima-1 accident (2011). The Chernobyl accident was a power-surge
accident that was caused by a failure of control of a ﬁssion chain reaction, which instantaneously destroyed the reactor
and building, whereas the Fukushima-1 accident was a loss-of-coolant accident in which the reactor cores of three
units were melted by decay heat after losing the electricity supply. Although the quantity of radioactive noble gases
released from Fukushima-1 exceeded the amount released from Chernobyl, the size of land area severely contami-
nated by 137Cesium (137Cs) was 10 times smaller around Fukushima-1 compared with around Chernobyl. The differ-
ences in the accident process are reﬂected in the composition of the discharged radioactivity as well as in the
composition of the ground contamination. Volatile radionuclides (such as 132Te-132I, 131I, 134Cs and 137Cs) contribu-
ted to the gamma-ray exposure from the ground contamination around Fukishima-1, whereas a greater variety of
radionuclides contributed signiﬁcantly around Chernobyl. When radioactivity deposition occurred, the radiation
exposure rate near Chernobyl is estimated to have been 770 μGy h−1 per initial 137Cs deposition of 1000 kBq m−2,
whereas it was 100 μGy h−1 around Fukushima-1. Estimates of the cumulative exposure for 30 years are 970 and 570
mGy per initial deposition of 1000 kBq m−2 for Chernobyl and Fukusima-1, respectively. Of these exposures, 49 and
98% were contributed by radiocesiums (134Cs + 137Cs) around Chernobyl and Fukushima-1, respectively.
KEYWORDS: Fukushima accident, Chernobyl accident, ground contamination, radiation exposure, 137Cesium,
131Iodine
INTRODUCTION
The worst-case scenarios at nuclear power plants are accidents that
result in direct release of accumulated radioactivity into the envir-
onment from the reactor core [1, 2]. Two kinds of accidents that
can cause such a situation have been of concern since the begin-
ning of nuclear power development: power-surge accidents and
loss-of-coolant accidents. The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station
(NPS) accident of 1986 belongs to the former group: the power
surge was caused by a failure to control ﬁssion chain reactions,
which led to an explosion that instantaneously destroyed the
reactor, together with its building [3, 4]. The Fukushima-1 acci-
dent of 2011 belongs to the latter group: the earthquake and
tsunami subsequently let to loss of both the offsite and onsite
power supply, leading to reactor core meltdown in three reactors
out of six units at the Fukushima-1 NPS [5, 6]. Both the Cherno-
byl and Fukushima-1 accidents are classiﬁed as Level-7, the worst
level on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In order to investigate the radiological impacts on biota from
nuclear accidents, it is important to obtain detailed information about
the composition of the radioactivity contamination and about the
level of radiation exposure in the environment. In this paper, the
basic features of the accident processes and the radiological conse-
quences (such as radioactivity release into the atmosphere, ground
contamination and gamma-ray exposure above the ground) are com-
pared between Chernobyl and Fukushima-1.
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Chernobyl accident
The Chernobyl-type reactor (RBMK-1000, 1000 MWe) was devel-
oped by the former USSR based on the reactor for producing pluto-
nium for nuclear weapons, and it was only used inside USSR
territory. At the time of the Chernobyl accident in April 1986, there
were 15 RBMK reactors operating at ﬁve NPSs in the USSR. At the
Chernobyl NPS in the Ukraine, four RBMK-1000 reactors were oper-
ating and two others were under construction. From the structure of
the reactor, RBMK can be classiﬁed as a graphite-moderator, boiling
light-water cooling and channel-type reactor, which have the follow-
ing weaknesses:
• a positive void reactivity coefﬁcient that appears when the
steam fraction increases in the fuel channels;
• a ‘positive scram’ effect when all control rods are inserted
into the core at the same time under certain extreme
operation conditions;
• complexity of reactor control, due to a large number of
channels in the core.
At midnight 24 April 1986, operation staff at the Chernobyl-4 unit
(3200 MWt) began to prepare the reactor for shutdown for mainten-
ance for the ﬁrst time since the start of operation in December 1983.
During the process of the shutting down the reactor, several tests
were planned, including testing of a new emergency generator system
using the inertial energy of the freewheeling turbines post shutdown.
Although this test was scheduled for during the day on 25 April at a
power level of 700–1000 MWt, it was postponed till the midnight. At
around 00:30 on 26 April, the reactor power suddenly fell to almost
zero. The operators tried to revive the reactor power, by pulling out
almost all control rods from the reactor core. At around 01:00, when
the reactor was stabilized at a power level of 200 MWt, it was decided
to carry out the generator test at a power level less than that planned.
At 01:23:04, by closing the steam valve to the turbine, the generator
test started. An emergency event started at 01:23:40 when the operators
turned on the AZ-5 button to shut down the reactor by inserting all
control rods into the core. Contrary to the intention of the operator, a
positive scram phenomenon led to a small power surge in the lower part
of the core, damaging the nuclear fuels and channel tubes. Following
rupture of the channel tubes, a large amount of water vapor appeared at
the core. Then, a bigger-scale power surge was caused by the effect of
the positive void coefﬁcient of reactivity, which led an explosion of the
reactor and destruction of the building. According to the analysis after
the accident, the explosion is believed to have occurred 6–7 s after
turning on AZ-5. Eyewitnesses outside the reactor building said that there
was a series of explosion-like ﬁreworks reaching up into the night sky.
(The above accident process is summarized from references [3] and [4].)
Graphite in the reactor core began to burn after the initial explo-
sion. This ﬁre continued for more than ten days, releasing a large
amount of the radioactivity that had accumulated in the core. The
daily discharge of radioactivity (based on estimates in the 1986 USSR
report [3]) is shown in Fig. 1a.
Fukushima-1 accident
There were six boiling water reactor (BWR) units on the site of the
Fukushima-1 NPS (Unit 1: 460 MWe; Units 2–5: 784 MWe; Unit 6:
1100 MWe). When the earthquake occurred at 14:46 on 11 March
2011, three units (Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 3) were operating in full
power, and the remaining three were out of operation due to annual
maintenance.
On the arrival of seismic waves, all three operating units were suc-
cessfully tripped by automatic insertion of control rods. However, the
transmission line for the offsite power supply was broken due to a
transmission tower falling down, as well as transformer damages at
the substation. In order to avoid blackout of the NPS, an Emergency
Diesel Generator (EDG) was automatically actuated at each unit.
About 40 min later, a series of tsunami waves hit the Fukushima-1
NPS, with wave heights of more than 10 m. The anti-tsunami protec-
tion was designed for ∼6 m. All EDGs from Unit 1 to Unit 4 were
located in the basement of the turbine buildings and ﬂooded with
seawater. Consequently, AC power was lost for cooling the reactor
cores of Unit 1 to Unit 3. In addition, the DC batteries also became
unavailable in Unit 1 and Unit 2 for powering the process instru-
ments and control valves.
When the cooling system does not work after shutdown of the
reactor, decay heat from ﬁssion products in the core will cause
Fig. 1. Estimates of daily release of radioactivity into the
atmosphere. (a) Chernobyl. Values are for all radionuclides
except rare gases and are decay-corrected to 26 April 1986.
(b) Fukushima-1. Daily release values are calculated by the
current authors based on the hourly data in ref. [7].
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increase in both the temperature and the pressure of the coolant
water, which will eventually result in meltdown of the reactor core
and melt-through of the reactor vessel. In order to avoid such a situ-
ation, several emergency cooling systems working without AC power
were installed in the BWR: an Isolation Condenser (IC) in Unit 1, a
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system in Units 2 and 3 and
a High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) system in Units 1 to 3. In
reality, however, these emergency systems could not prevent further
development of the situation, partly because the DC power necessary
to actuate and control them was lost at Units 1 and 2, and partly
because they were not designed to be effective for such a long period
as was needed during the event in Fukushima-1.
At Unit 1, its reactor core began to be damaged in the evening of
11 March, and a high Containment Vessel (CV) pressure of 840 kPa
was recorded at midnight, which was about two times higher than the
pressure for which it was designed (427 kPa). It was clear that CV
destruction at this stage would mean the worst situation at the NPS.
Around 14:30 on 12 March, CV venting was ﬁnally carried out to
reduce the CV pressure. Then at 15:36 a hydrogen explosion
occurred inside the upper part of the reactor building. Core cooling
of Unit 1 by ﬁre engines started in the evening of 12 March.
At Unit 3, after the tsunami hit, core cooling was maintained by
RCIC until 11:36 on 12 March. After RCIC stopped, HPCI was auto-
matically actuated and continued working until 02:42 on 13 March. Its
core damage is believed to have begun on the morning of 13 March.
PC venting was carried out several times on 13 March. At 11:01 on
14 March, a hydrogen explosion occurred inside the reactor building.
At Unit 2 at the time the tsunami hit, the RCIC was working.
It continued to work without DC power until 13:25 on 14 March.
Its core damage is believed to have begun on the evening of 14
March. CV venting was tried but was unsuccessful. A high CV pres-
sure of 600 kPa was recorded during the night and this high pressure
continued until the next morning. A rapid decrease in the CV pres-
sure was observed at about 06:00 on 15 March, which indicated
serious damage to the CV integrity of Unit 2. This resulted in the
largest radioactivity release that occurred during the course of the
Fukushima-1 accident.
The daily radioactivity discharge of 131I and 134Cs + 137Cs from
the Fukushima-1 NPS is shown in Fig. 1b, based on estimates by
UNSCEAR [7].
Radioactivity release
The radioactivity released into the atmosphere for Chernobyl and
Fukushima-1 is compared in Table 1. The estimates of the Chernobyl
Forum [8] are a summary from various studies.
The UNSCEAR values [7] are mainly based on Terada et al. [9],
which report itself is based on an inversion technique combining the
monitoring data from the environment with the results of atmos-
pheric transport simulation of released radioactivity.
It is clear that the 131I and 137Cs release from Fukushima-1 was
signiﬁcantly less than from Chernobyl. Comparison of the ﬁndings of
UNSCEAR and the Chernobyl Forum indicates that 131I and 137Cs
releases from Fukushima-1 were 7% and 10% of the respective
releases from Chernobyl. The released radioactivity in the form of
90Sr, 239Pu and other radionuclides from Fukushima-1 is considered
to be far less than that released from Chernobyl, which reﬂects the
difference in the accident process. In the case of the Chernobyl
accident, the explosion occurred inside the reactor core, and the
reactor materials themselves (such as nuclear fuels and graphite
blocks) were dispersed into the atmosphere. Thus, the composition
of the radionuclides discharged from Chernobyl was similar to that
found in the reactor core. In contrast to this, the reactor cores did not
explode in Fukushima-1, and the radioactivity discharge was mostly
composed of gaseous and volatile radionuclides emitted from the
damaged and melted reactor cores. Two hydrogen explosions
occurred at Fukushima-1 under the roof of the reactor building of
Unit 1 and Unit 3, but they were not inside the CVs.
Far less discharge of 90Sr and 239,240Pu into the atmosphere from
Fukushima-1 than Chernobyl was conﬁrmed by the measurement of
Table 1. Estimates of released radioactivity (PBq) of major
radionuclides into the atmosphere: Chernobyl and
Fukushima-1














n.a. = not assessed.
Table 2. Comparison of 137Cs, 90Sr and 239,240Pu
contamination in the soil of Iitate village and Kiev city
Contamination density, Bq m−2
137Cs 90Sr 239,240Pu
Iitate village: 30–40 km north-west of Fukushima-1 NPS [10]
Sample 1 1 000 000 390a 0.03
Sample 2 590 000 300a 0.07
Sample 3 2 200 000 790a 0.2
Kiev city: 110 km South of Chernobyl NPS [11]
Average of six samples 25 000 5800 160
aMeasured by the Kyushu Environmental Evaluation Association. Values include
global fallout.
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soil samples. Table 2 shows 90Sr, 239,240Pu and 137Cs contamination
in soil samples taken in Iitate village [10] together with those taken
in Kiev [11]. Deposition ratios of 90Sr and 239,240Pu, to 137Cs were
0.23 and 0.006, respectively, in Kiev whereas they were 0.0004 –
0.0005 and 10−7– 10−8 in Iitate.
Ground contamination and radiation exposure
In regard to the long-term effects of radioactive contamination in the
environment, 137Cs is the most important radionuclide, both in Cher-
nobyl and Fukushima-1. The size of area severely contaminated by
137Cs for the two accidents is compared in Table 3 [12, 13]. The con-
taminated area around Chernobyl is more than 10 times larger than
Fukushima-1. It is noteworthy, however, that although the Chernobyl
NPS is surrounded by land, the eastern half of the surroundings of
Fukushima-1 is in the Paciﬁc Ocean, and most of the discharged
radioactivity from Fukushima-1 is believed to have streamed toward
the ocean, blown by the prevailing westerlies over Japan.
The radionuclide composition of the ground contamination
within 100 km of the Chernobyl NPS is reported by Izrael et al. [14].
They indicate that the composition varies, depending on direction
from the NPS and also on distance. In Table 4, the relative deposition
ratios of major radionuclides to 137Cs contributing gamma-ray expos-
ure are shown for the near western area of the Chernobyl NPS, where
the initial plume passed over on the ﬁrst day of the accident. The rela-
tive deposition ratios around Fukushima-1 are also shown in Table 4
(values are taken from UNSCEAR [7]).
Based on the deposition ratios in Table 4, the gamma-ray exposure
rates at 1 m above ground per initial 137Cs deposition of 1000 Bq m−2
are calculated and plotted in Fig. 2 for 90 days after deposition. Radi-
ation exposure conversion factors are taken from Beck [15] for a case of
0.16 g cm−2 of relaxation length as depth distribution. A clear difference
is seen between Chernobyl and Fukushima-1. Compared withTable 3. Size of severely contaminated area around Chernobyl
and Fukushima-1
137Cs contamination level
From 555 to 1480 kBq m−2 >1480 kBq m−2
Chernobyl [12] 7200 km2 3100 km2
Fukushima-1 [13] 495 km2 272 km2
137Cs contamination level of 555 and 1480 kBq m−2 corresponds to criteria for
compulsory resettlement and alienation, respectively, around Chernobyl.
Table 4. Deposition ratios of major radionuclides to 137Cs that
contributed gamma-ray exposure at 1 m above ground











95Zr 65.5 d 2.82 20
95Nb 35.0 d 2.92 20
103Ru 39.3 d 1.85 16
131I 8.04 d 1.49 18 11.5
132Te 3.25 d 0.79 28 8
132I (2.30 h)a 8.61 28 8
134Cs 2.07 y 5.97 0.4 1
137Cs 30.1 y 2.18 1 1
140Ba 12.8 d 0.57 22
140La (1.68 d)a 7.83 11
239Np 2.36 d 0.60 120
aThese radionuclides are treated at radioactive equilibrium with parent
radionuclides. Exposure rate conversion factors are taken from Beck [15] for a case
of 0.16 g cm−2 of relaxation length for depth distribution. Values for Chernobyl are
values on the day of the accident, 26 April 1986. Values for Fukushima-1 are on
15 March 2011, when the most severe ground contamination occurred.
Fig. 2. Temporary change of gamma-ray exposure rate at 1 m
above ground per initial 137Cs deposition of 1000 kBq m−2
for 90 days after the deposition. (a) Chernobyl. Relative
deposition ratios to 137Cs are taken from Izrael et al [14] for
near western area from Chernobyl NPS. (b) Fukushima-1.
Deposition ratios are taken from UNSCEAR [7] for all Japan
except southern direction from Fukushima-1 NPS.
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Fukushima-1, 95Z, 95Nb, 103Ru and 140La made a signiﬁcant contribu-
tion to the radiation exposure resulting from the Chernobyl accident.
The initial exposure rate of 770 μGy h−1 for Chernobyl was 7.7 times
larger than that for Fukushima-1, which was 100 μGy h−1. After 30
days, almost all the radiation exposure for Fukushima-1 was due to
radiocesiums (134Cs and 137Cs), whereas the contribution of radioce-
siums for Chernobyl was only 6% of the total exposure, even on the
90th day.
The cumulative exposure normalized to the initial 137Cs depos-
ition of 1000 kBq m−2 is shown in Fig. 3 for the ﬁrst 30 years after
deposition, both for Chernobyl and Fukushima-1. Thick solid and
thick dashed lines indicate the total exposure and the sum of the
contributions from 134Cs and 137Cs, respectively, for Chernobyl.
Thin solid and thin dashed lines indicate the equivalent values for
Fukushima-1. The total cumulative exposure for the ﬁrst year and
the ﬁrst 30 years are 500 and 970 mGy, respectively, for Chernobyl,
whereas the values are 63 and 570 mGy for Fukushima-1. The
difference in total radiation exposure between Chernobyl and
Fukushima is mainly due to the exposure during the ﬁrst year when
95Z, 95Nb, 103Ru and 140La made a signiﬁcant contribution. The
contribution of radiocesiums to the total exposure for the ﬁrst year
was 7.4 and 83% for Chernobyl and Fukushima-1, respectively. For
the period of 30 years the contributions have been calculated to be
49 and 98% for Chernobyl and Fukushima-1, respectively.
From the point of long-term impact on the environment by the
Fukushima-1 accident, our attention should be focused on radiation
exposure from radiocesiums. The situation around Chernobyl is dif-
ferent from that around Fukushima-1 because radionuclides other
than radiocesiums (e.g. 90Sr and Pu isotopes) are believed to make a
greater contribution at Chernobyl. We note that radioactive contam-
ination in the Paciﬁc Ocean by the Fukushima-1 accident has
not been discussed here. Several studies on radioactivity release into
the Paciﬁc Ocean have been summarized by UNSCEAR [7],
but there are large areas of uncertainty. Considering the leakage of
contaminated water continues to ﬂow through an unknown under-
ground path from the Unit buildings, more efforts are needed for
study of the radioactivity release into the Paciﬁc Ocean.
CONCLUSION
The Chernobyl accident was a power-surge accident in which failure
to control a ﬁssion chain reaction instantaneously destroyed the
reactor and building, whereas the Fukushima-1 accident was a loss-of-
coolant accident in which the reactor cores of three units were melted
by decay heat after the loss of electricity. The differences in the accident
processes are reﬂected in the composition of the ground contamination.
Only volatile radionuclides (such as 132Te-132I, 131I, 134Cs and 137Cs)
contributed gamma-ray exposure around Fukushima-1, but a variety of
radionuclides contributed signiﬁcantly around Chernobyl. At the time
when the radioactivity deposition occurred, the radiation exposure rate
near Chernobyl is estimated to have been 770 μGy h−1 per initial 137Cs
deposition of 1000 kBq m−2, whereas it was 100 μGy h−1 around
Fukushima-1. Estimates of the cumulative exposure for 30 years are
970 and 570 mGy per initial deposition of 1000 kBq m−2 for Cher-
nobyl and Fukushima-1, respectively. Of these exposures, 49 and
98% were contributed by radiocesiums (134Cs + 137Cs) around Cher-
nobyl and Fukushima-1, respectively.
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